The Third Campaign -from 1811 to 1814.

The Breakout

In the spring of 1811 Massena withdrew even more troops from around the lines because of increasing difficulties in feeding them. It is considered that in the winter of 1810 to 1811 the French army lost over 20,000 men to starvation.

For the campaign in 1811 Wellington had planned to capture the great fortresses of Cuidad Rodrigo, Badajoz and Almeida. MI of which commanded the roads into Spain, down which the allies would have to travel if they were to march on Madrid in order to drive the French out of Spain which was their ultimate aim. Initially Wellington sent Beresford with 20,000 men south to invest the strongest of the Fortresses at Badajoz. The rest of the Army, some 38,000 troops then headed north to try to capture the other two fortresses.

The l/IX had moved into the Fort Sobral in January 1811 despite the fact the French held the town. The French retreated via Coimbra but Wellington's pursuit was sufficient to keep the French moving rather than trying to bring them to baffle. By 11th April 1811 the Regiment passed into Spain at Aldea do Bispo. However in order to open the road to Madrid Wellington had to command the road from Coimbra to Salamanca. The French army had begun to build up its strength and Marshall Massena was determined to prevent the allies from taking the fortress of Cuidad Rodrigo.

Fuentes de Oñoro

Marshall Massena set out from Cuidad Rodrigo to march to relieve Almedia but by 3rd May the two armies faced each other through the village of Fuentes de Oñoro. The 5th division, at this time commanded by Erskine was well away from the action to the west covering the possible line of retreat and the 1/IX were not engaged on this occasion, although on the 5th May the light company had some skirmishing with Reynier's troops. However the battle was fast furious and bloody. The village was fought over for some hours and changed hands a number of times. Eventually the French withdrew in pretty good order leaving the British in command of the field. It was expected that the baffle would continue on the morning of the 4th, but both armies were exhausted and there was little action. On the 5th the baffle was rejoined and again the village changed hands on a number of occasions but neither side were able to achieve any material advantage and after another day the battle had been fought to a stand still. Massena was not able to relieve Almedia but had prevented Wellington from advancing on Cuidad Rodrigo.

On 10th May the French commander blew up the armouries in Almedia with an incredible explosion. The Light Company of 1/IX including James Hale were sent in pursuit and succeeded in cutting off the retreat of the French. Following this small action there was a period of inactivity while the focus shifted away. The 1/IX camped in and around the town of Sabugal in Portugal. For the next few months 1/IX moved around the mountainous country between Cuidad Rodrigo and Badajoz in order to prevent the French from attempting to raise the sieges. Eventually the Regiment was sent to winter

with the rest of Hay's 5th division at Guarda, disappointingly still in Portugal. The campaign of 1811 had not made a great deal of progress but they were well forward of the Lisbon area.

Albuera

Away to the South Beresford's troops besieging Badajoz received intelligence that the French armies from the south were moving up to relieve the fortress. Marshall Soult was on the move with 25,000 men at his disposal. On 13th May the allies moved 32,000 men to the south to face this threat and chose to fight at Alburea. Soult' s men were able to ford the river and began to move into a strong position on the allies' right flank and threatened to roll up the line.

Late in October Sir Rowland Hill led a successful expedition to capture the village of Arroyo dos Molinos in the mountains on the Portuguese Spanish boarder. This operation successfully captured over 1500 troops and involved the allies in very few loses.

Effectively this was the end of the 1811 campaign and Marshall Marmont the new French Commander was strongly encouraged by Wellington's disinformation to think that the British troops were retiring to their cantonments for the winter season. However this was not Wellington's intention.

The Siege and Storming of Cuidad Rodrigo

In December 1811 and early in 1812 Wellington made a major bid to capture Cuidad Rodrigo and on 19th January 1812 it was successfully stormed. A major effort had been made to prepare for this particular siege and a great deal of preparation went into the investing.

Two breaches had been made in the walls and Picton's division the Fighting Third were to attack the greater and the Light division the lesser. All the planning paid off and the storming was very successful with relatively low casualty rates on both sides.

The 5th division had been moved into a position to prevent the French relief columns from getting through. However no attempt was made and so the regiment did not come directly into action. However they were brought in after the event to help with the clearing up and to restore discipline to the rampaging troops.

The division with Sir James Leith restored to command spent some time at Cuidad Rodrigo making the fortress dependable again. Eventually they were ordered to join the great siege of Badajoz. They arrived there about 26 March 1812. When the storming of the fortress took place on the night of 6th April 1812 the 1 /IX were allocated a relatively minor task of creating a diversion to try to draw attention away from the main assaults.

The Siege and Storming of Badajoz

The storming of Badajoz is one of the greatest and most infamous events of the whole Peninsula war. The Fortress was extremely well fortified and defended by over 5,000 French troops. This was the allies' third attempt to capture Badajoz and they all knew that it would be a very tough proposition. It soon became a problem of a deadline when Wellington learnt that there were two French relief columns approaching Badajoz. There is no doubt that this problem persuaded Wellington to storm early and as soon as the breaches were considered practical.

In the event there were to be three stormings, Leith's 5th division were to storm the western bastion of St Vincente, the Light and 4th Divisions the breaches in the Trinidad bastion and the 3rd Division to storm the castle.

However the 1/IX were not directly involved since they were to create a diversion in order to distract the French from the attacks on the breaches. Hale indicates however that the Light Company and perhaps the Grenadiers as well, were involved with Leith's storming party.

The main breach at the Trinidad bastion saw some of the fiercest fighting of the whole war. It has been calculated that there were over forty attempts to take the breach. In the contusion, dark, and wet environment it is believed that over 2000 of the 4th and Light Divisions perished and no ground was gained.

It quickly became evident that the advantage was with the French and it began to look as if the operation would fail. To the east Picton's 3rd division were attempting to storm the castle across the very tricky flooded area. The intention was that this attack and that on the St Vincente bastion should really be diversions to keep the French forces tied down.

However the 3rd were determined to take the castle and slowly began to make headway. Eventually Campbell's brigade forced their way into the town and the advantage began to move towards the allies. Hay's 5th division also managed bravely to fight their way into the west of the town. Both these parties then began to fight their way into the rear of the French lines at the main breach. It became clear to the French Commanders that their position was increasingly untenable.

It is interesting to note that the historians of the time believed that Wellington was on the verge of ordering the recall when he received information that Picton had entered the castle. He then waited to see if this information was confirmed and what effect it would have on the battle.

The events that followed are well documented. The Army rampaged totally out of control for three or four days. No one was safe and it is believed that the British settled a number of personal scores during this time including the murder of some officers. Hale records that the regiment was in the town and that one of their drummers drowned in a cellar full of brandy.

The storming had cost well over 3000 casualties and the whole siege in excess of 5,000. Wellington was deeply affected by the losses at Badajoz.

Shortly after the fall of Badajoz and the further victory of Sir Rowland Hill at Almaraz Wellington began to receive intelligence that the French were withdrawing some of their best troops and the Army in Spain was being significantly weakened. Unfortunately, for these troops, they were to find themselves heading to Moscow and the awful winter campaign of1812 and 1813.

Salamanca

By early July the 1/IX is with the main body of the army outside of Salamanca facing 50,000 troops under the command of Marshall Marmont. There then followed almost a month of shadow boxing and counter marching as each of the commanders tried to manoeuvre an advantageous position. Numerically the armies were evenly matched although the French were considered to have a significant advantage in terms of quality.

On 22nd July a series of rather trivial misjudgements presented Wellington with the opportunity that he had been looking for. Marmont mistakenly thought that the allies were retreating back toward Cuidad Rodrigo and in order to take advantage he extended his line to the west. This suddenly offered Wellington the chance he was waiting for, an attack was launched against the left-hand flank of the French, this was a complete surprise and the Eagles broke quickly. As a result Wellington threw in Leith's 5th division against the French extended centre. Hay's brigade including 1/IX led this charge against Maucune's troops and went on to rout part of another division. Despite all this action the regiment sustained very low casualties in this important battle. In all the French are believed to have lost the best part of three or four divisions in this action. However the allies failed to capitalise on the victory as a result of a breakdown of communication between the British and the Spanish.

On the 11th August Joseph evacuated Madrid leaving behind him a few poor quality troops to garrison the city. On 13th August 1812 Wellington entered the city in triumph, however he did not allow the army to take up quarters in the capital because of a fear that their fighting fitness might be compromised by the attractions and facilities. The Army was encamped at El Escorial some miles to the north of Madrid. After a couple of weeks Wellington again turned north to continue the pursuit of the French armies.

The division marched from El Escorial early in September and took a western route towards Valladolid. They then swung to a north-easterly direction towards Burgos. Here the French had fortified the castle and decided to make a stand. The British army did not handle this phase of the campaign at all well. Despite drawing up his forces for a battle Wellington failed to engage the French and after a minor skirmish both sides withdrew.

At this time Wellington received intelligence that Sir Rowland Hill at Madrid was being put under considerable pressure by Marshall Soult's advance from the south and would have withdraw. This meant that his southern flank would be badly exposed and so with the on set of winter approaching Wellington took the very unpopular decision to retreat back into Portugal. As the Army retreated the discipline began to break down, very reminiscent of the problems that had occurred during Sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna some three years earlier. By this time the 1/IX had been reduced to 300 men with few officers but they were still an effective force and were involved in the defence of critical bridges over the river at Palencia. Hale tells us that during this action one company of the regiment was surrounded and captured. The 5th division formed the rear guard as the army retreated. During this period late in September there were many small actions fought around the rivers of the area. A game of cat and mouse developed, each army rushing to try to secure crossing points across the rivers swollen with winter rain, once across they would blow up the bridge in order to delay their enemy.

On 6th November Wellington and Hill's armies met just north of Salamanca, now the army was together again it was a reasonable size, some 65,000 plus troops. Wellington's fears of an attack by Soult on his very disorganised troops did not materialise and the army was able to continue its retreat by way of Cuidad Rodrigo. Wellington was extremely critical of the conduct of the army during this retreat, however the 1 /IX maintain that they retained good order and discipline throughout, citing the fact that only two men were lost to desertion. Certainly Hale makes no mention of disorder, but he would not sully the reputation of his regiment. The regiment wintered at Lamego well inside Portugal. They had had to surrender all the advances that they had gained in 1812, it must have been a very depressing period for them.

The opportunity was taken to replenish with stores and men. The l/IX received over 500 men from the 2/IX in Gibraltar an additional 100 men rejoined the regiment from the hospitals and new recruits came out from the depot at Canterbury to join them. As a result the 1/IX was back to full strength despite illness during the winter.

Wellington's plan for 1813 was to threaten the French lines of communication. The French army had weakened and Paris was very much distracted by the problems in Russia. Consequently the Iberian command were uncertain and insecure. Thus the threat to their lines of retreat was a considerable concern to them. The Allied advance was expected by the French to come through central Spain. Wellington fed this point of view by a campaign of disinformation but it was always his intention to swing to the north and then drop down on to the French lines of communication.

Despite a relatively late start to the campaign the division were at Medina de Rio Seco north of Valladolid by early June. They had moved up as part of the column under the command of Sir Thomas Graham who had joined the army from the South. Surprisingly the French surrendered their fortress at Burgos without a fight by blowing it up.

Vittoria

By keeping to the more northerly route Wellington posed a threat to the French right flank. However the Marshals were beginning to draw their forces together. By mid June the French forces were consolidating and there were a number of heavy skirmishing encounters. By 20th June it was clear that there would be a major engagement during the coming days. The French army began to take up positions to the west of Vittoria and as Wellington's divisions arrive in the area they began to prepare. The allied armies were considerably stronger than the French. The winter preparations also meant that the opportunity for training had been taken and so the 72,000 strong allied army was in very good shape. The French had about 60,000 and the advantage of defending.

The rout of the French was complete; the infantry regiments broke and streamed off the battlefield with the allies in hot pursuit. The casualties were relatively high. It is estimated that the French lost between 7,000 and 8,000 men and the allies over 5,000. 1/IX lost 9 dead and 15 wounded which under the circumstances could be considered light One of the regiments in the 5th division lost over 100 men to the grape fire of the batteries before the 1/IX was deployed, so the regiment was pretty lucky. The British army however failed to capitalise on this rout, whether because of exhaustion or because their attention was distracted by the plunder that was available is something of a moot point.

The 5th division was ordered to stay in Vittoria in order to restore order to the town after another outbreak of plundering and drunkenness by the victorious troops. This orgy led to Wellington's famous comment in his despatches about the "scum of the earth"

In due course the 5th was sent to try to locate Clausel's corps, which was known to be approaching the area. However they failed to locate them and in due course were ordered to join Sir Thomas Graham's column that was marching to invest San Sebastian. There is no doubt that the battle of Vittoria was the decisive point of the campaign in the Peninsula.

The Road to France

After the defeat of the French at Vittoria the road to France itself was open to Wellington's army. However there were still many difficulties to be overcome. The major physical barrier was the Pyrenean mountain range that ran almost from the Atlantic coast to the Mediterranean. Also as Wellington' S army approached these mountains there were strong French garrisons and fortifications at San Sebastian on the western flank and at Pamplona on the eastern flank of the army.

In this northern area there were really only three practical routes from Spain into Southern France. The coastal plain across the river Irun' the Maya pass and the Roncesvalle's pass to the east. Wellington expected that the French Commander would attempt to relieve San Sebastian across the Irun. However Soult chose the other option and planned a very careful campaign to push through the mountain passes where he rightly believed the British and allied troop dispositions were significantly weaker. The terrain was very difficult but did provide the defenders with considerable advantages. However it was such that the cavalry were virtually useless and the manovering of the guns virtually impossible. The weather was highly unpredictable and could be very changeable. The coming series of running actions fought in this difficult mountainous terrain over the coming weeks became known as the Battle of the Pyrenees.

The Pyrenees

Wellington was well aware of the problems he faced, defending a mountainous fifty mile boarder was a major undertaking, and despite now being able to use the local ports on the northern coast of Spain the logistics were extremely difficult. Soult launched the Imperial Eagles into the mountains on 25th July 1813. His plain was to relieve Pamplona, swing south to meet up with Suchet's army, which was coming up from South east Spain, and together they would head to San Sebastian force the lifting of the siege and then attack Wellington from the west and force him to retreat into Spain.

On the day the French set out the weather was very poor. As a result they advanced quickly into the passes without their presence being detected. The French fell on the unsuspecting British defenders in the early morning in considerable strength; consequently they were quickly forced to retreat from their well-prepared defensive positions. The general terrain allowed them to retreat slowly and the French advance was inexorable but slow. The British commanders got their reserve battalions into place quickly but the French numbers were so overwhelming that it was all they could do to retire in good order in a controlled manner.

It was not until the evening of 26th July that Wellington heard that the French had moved in force. He immediately rode south accompanied by a single ADC to take command. On the 27th July he arrived in the village of Sorauren he was spotted by the Portuguese troops and a great cheer went up. This spread like wild fire through the ranks and gave a great boost to morale, and this was heard by the French camp with a consequential decline in their morale, they knew exactly who they were fighting!

The first battle of Sorauren was fought on 28th July 1813, by which time Wellington's reinforcements were arriving from the west. The French advance was held and late in the afternoon a stalemate existed. During the next day it became clear to Soult that the advance through the Maya pass had not succeeded and he could not reasonable expect any reinforcement. Conversely Wellington's troop were arriving in large numbers. So he abandoned the garrison in Pamplona to their fate and ordered a retreat. The British took frill advantage of this to bring into operation their superiority in artillery and caused considerable casualties amongst the retreating forces. This is sometimes referred to as the second battle of Sorauren. This was the last time that the French attempted to return to Spain, from now on the French army was on the defensive, trying to limit the allies from advancing into metropolitan France.

The Siege and Storming of San Sebastian

Early in July the 1/IX arrived outside San Sebastian. The town was heavily fortified and contained a very strong fortress. The garrison was relatively small but ably lead. The town was surrounded on three sides by tidal waters that restricted access except at low tide.

The 1/IX led an attack on the outer fortifications around the convent in the town that had been battered by the artillery. The capture of this would provide the artillery with an almost ideal place for a battery. On 17th July 1813 there were three attacks against the convent before it was successfully taken. However the action had been fierce and the casualties heavy. After the outer defences had been successfully taken the army settled down to the heavy business of taking the fortress of Monte Orgullo. By 23rd July the breach in the wall was considered practical and the planning of the storming was put in hand. It was expected that this would happen on the 24th, however this was not possible because of a fire in the breach. Unusually the plan was to storm the fortress during the day because the tidal considerations were important. On 25th July at about 4:30 a.m. Lieutenant Campbell of the 1/IX led the forlorn hope consisting of troops from the light companies of 3/1st, 1 /IX, and 1/3 8th The initial assault was repulsed with heavy losses and in considerable confusion.

After this failure there was a considerable delay, partly as the result of a shortage of supplies and partly to allow further planning to be carried out. By 27th August things had been taken in hand and the Army was ready for another attempt at storming. A party of 100 from 1/IX set off to successfully capture an island in the bay so that a battery could be placed on it to enfilade the fortress. However there was considerable discord building up amongst the troops of the 5th division. Wellington found out and was very displeased to the extent of threatening to withdraw them from the operation in disgrace. This did not happen. Eventually it was decided that the storming would take place on 31st August.

This second storming ran into similar problems to the first, really as a result of the fierce resistance from the French defenders. Sir Thomas Graham then brought in a new approach, what we would recognise as a rolling barrage firing the artillery over the heads of the advancing infantry. In the Peninsula war this tactic had been used very occasionally but was considered too risky. As the tide rose the assault began to falter but the British were helped by an explosion in the French ammunition store. The French retired from the defences in town into the fortress. As the British entered the town there were scenes of total chaos with plundering, rape and murder being common place.

The allied forces then had to start all over again seeking to storm the fortress, however the French garrison had begun to lose heart. After some days bombardment Hale says the British Commanders called on the French to surrender, when they did not the bombardment started again but then very shortly afterwards the French decided to call it a day and their very brave resistance at San Sebastian was at an end.

The Nivelle

After the end of this action the 5th was called forward to the front on the river Bidassoa. On 6th October the regiment passed into France for the first time in this campaign. Leith Hay had now taken over the division and Grenville was now the brigade commander. In appalling weather the British troops crossed the river to engage the French army. During the course of the battle the 1/IX were involved in a critical charge against a French battery at the redoubt of Croix des Bouquets and during this period of action 1/IX earnt a major commendation from the allied commander Wellington and he personally thanked them for their coolness under fire.

Bad weather in early November held up the British advance towards the Nivelle. The 5th division was on the very left of Wellington's army and was order to make a feint attack against St Jean de Luz in order to draw Soult's troops away from the main thrust towards Bayonne. Wellington's plan was to attack the centre and right of Soult's line, to roll it up westward, and bring the allied troops towards Bayonne and Bordeaux from the east.

After successfully splitting Soult's army in two the British and their allies continued to push the dispirited French army back towards Bayonne. The town had always been a major French army depot its fortifications had been designed by the great Sebastian Vauban and was strongly pro-Napoleon

The next major barrier was crossing the Nive; this river severely restricted the area of operations available to Wellington who was under considerable pressure from London to press on it to France in order to increase the political pressure on the French government to depose Napoleon. Wellington had also taken the political decision to send all the Spanish troops back to Spain because he feared that they would take reprisals against the French civilian population for the behaviour of the French army in Spain. He could not afford to alienate the populace.

On 9th December 1/IX moved forward along the St Jean de Luz to Bayonne road towards Bayonne. At the Heights of Barouillet they became engaged in heavy skirmishing pushing the French north along the road toward Bayonne. At night they retired almost to their starting position. On the following morning Marshall Soult decided to contain the advance and by 10th December 1813 it was clear that around Bayonne there would be a significant action in the coming day. When the French started to advance it was rather half hearted, and in some confusion they made little progress. The 1/IX and a Portuguese regiment came across this action and caused considerable havoc and casualties. Eventually after a shaky start the British commanders managed to get sufficient forces into the field to see off the French forces. In the course of this battle the l/IX were in considerable danger of being surrounded but managed to break out and in the process took over 400 French infantry as prisoners.

On the next day after a difficult early trauma the regiment were surprised at their lunch by a French advance. They were caught in considerable disorder but for help from an unspecified British Regiment the division could have been embarrassed, however the situation was recovered and no significant ground was lost. However in two days the regiment had lost nearly 200 men. Elsewhere on the battle field Marshall Soult had managed to separate the two main parts of the Army on either side of the Nive and then attacked the weaker commanded by Sir Rowland Hill. There followed a desperate battle and Wellington was only just able to bring up reinforcements in time, eventually the French were pushed back into the town.

Following the battle the armies settled down into camp for the winter and other than skirmishing little happen on this front, although elsewhere there were major developments as the Austrian, Prussian, and Russians closed in around Paris.

In mid February the division was ordered to invest the port of Bayonne and 1/IX was involved in blockading the town rather than a frill siege. 1/IX Regiment was not involved in the Battle of Orthes fought on 27th February 1814, as the British faced Soult again some way to the east of Bayonne. Eventually after a very hard fight the French were put to flight and retreated in considerable disorder towards Toulouse. Over the next few days there were significant fights in a number of locations but Soult reach the main army depot at Toulouse and was able re-equip. his exhausted troops.

There was also the Battle of Toulouse on 10 April but the regiment played no part in it since they were manning the blockade at Bayonne. On 14th April, after Napoleon's abdication there was a break out sortie by the French garrison at Bayonne which cost a number of casualties. This is considered to be the last action of 1/IX in the Peninsula. Marshall Soult signed an armistice on 17th April 1814 formally bring the campaign in the Peninsula to an end.

In May 1814 the Regiment marched from Bayonne to Bordeaux and embarked on HMS York and HMS Vengeur to sail to Quebec in Canada to lend support to the British Forces fighting the Americans in the boarder war of 1812 to 1814.

Early in June 1815 the regiment was called back to England after Napoleon had left Elba and was threatening Belgium. However when the great battle of Waterloo was fought the regiment was on the high seas. They landed at Ostend on 17th August 1815 and marched to Paris arriving on 5th September 1815 to be part of the army of occupation in various parts of France until June 1818. They were then ordered back to England. In January 1819 the regiment was posted to the West Indies.