First Campaign

On 15/16 August 1808 four companies of the 95th engaged the out posts of the French force, and their Baker rifles must have come as a major shock since they were accurate up to 300 metres, three times as far as the normal military musket. The first action of the Peninsula campaign had been fought.

Wellesley now started to get ready for the first battle at a very small village called Rolica. After this action Wellesley established a bivouac camp just south of the small village of Vimeiro a few miles on the river Maceira. It was here that the Army received its first reinforcements when part of Sir Harry Burrand’s troops arrived and Anstruther’s and Acland’s brigades came ashore but sustained some losses in the heavy surf. Amongst those brigaded with Anstruther was the 2/IX. It is interesting to note that all the battalions in this brigade were 2nd battalions. It is unusual to find two battalions of the same regiment involved in the same battle. Certainly as far as the East Norfolks (The IX) this occurred only twice in the Peninsula, here at Vimeiro and again at the next major engagement at the Battle of the Duoro in Oporto in 1809.

Vimeiro

These reinforcements were most welcome since the battle at Rolica the French had substantially consolidated their forces. The British now numbered about 17,000 and the French around 13,000. As they formed up Wellesley took an inherently defensive posture and waited for Junot to approach.

It has to be said that Marshal Junot did not seem to take the matter very seriously, it seems that he left over half his available forces behind to garrison Lisbon and the troops that he did bring were not perhaps the best available to him. It surprising that he did not bring all his available cavalry. The conclusion that must be drawn was that he was rather over confident of victory.

Wellesley was very keen that this action should start early and he hoped that the outcome would be decided before Sir Harry Burrand was able to take effective command in the field. Sir Harry had spent the night on board ship off the coast and it would clearly take some time for him to get to the action. He in turn was expecting to pass command to Sir Hew Dalrymple within the next 24 hours and consequently did not seem particularly keen to be involved.

In early morning Wellesley realised that the French planned to attack and to attempt to turn his left flank. Quickly and efficiently he re-deployed his forces, completely changing the emphasis. As a result the 1/IX found themselves in reserve rather than the focus of the French columns. Rowland Hill’s brigade ended up having a relatively quiet action. However the same cannot be said of Anstruther’s newly arrive troops. The 2/IX found themselves heavily committed in the main defence of Vimeiro Hill above the strategic village.

The particular battle was one of the early examples of two of the main tactics devised by Wellesley to defeat the French in the Peninsula and in due course at Waterloo. Firstly he used the steady double line of his infantry in order to bring to bear on the advancing columns of the French as much fire power as possible. Secondly he used the reverse slop tactic in order to deceive and surprise the enemy in order to create confusion and chaos on the battlefield.

The tactic of using the line to face the column is central to the success of the British Army of the period. It has been much written about, discussed and argued about. The simple fact is that normally it worked for Wellesley. In essence it depended totally on the discipline of the infantry. Each regiment was drawn up in companies in two line, early on a three deep system had been tried but rejected. The principle was simple the idea was to bring to bear every available musket in order to volley at the head of the column and maximise its effect.

The second element was to try to conceal the strength of the force by hiding most of the men below the sky line on the reverse slope. This had the strong advantages of reducing their exposure to artillery and encouraging the enemy force to come on in column. It was fairly normal for the troops to lay down and not show themselves until the enemy were only 100 yards away, consequently the tactic frequently prevented the French infantry moving into line as a response.

At Vimeiro Thomieres’ French infantry firstly engaged the heavy skirmishing line of 5/60th and 2/95th who gradually retired on to the main position held by 1/50th, 2/52nd and 2/97th battalions. Hidden behind them on the reverse slopes were 2/IX and 2/43rd. Gradually the French columns forced back the British skirmish line which had taken considerable advantage of the superior accuracy and range of the Baker rifles to delay the advance. By the time the Rifles retired the French had committed three columns to the attack. These columns advanced in order of forty men wide and thirty men deep effectively giving them 200 muskets that could fire. They were approaching 900 British infantry in two lines, thus all their muskets could be bought to bear on the advancing column. The advantage soon told.

The British maintained their rate of fire, a volley crashed into the head of the column every 20 seconds and as the column got closer so the accuracy improved. It must have been devastating. The first column quickly broke and scattered and fire was then concentrated on the second column. Anstruther then brought the 2/IX and 2/43rd into play. Once the main line had engaged the column the two additional battalions closed in on opposite flanks in a horseshoe pattern and proceeded to pour volleys into the side of the column. It was not long before Thomieres recognised the futility of the situation and withdrew. As the French infantry started back down the hill they were easy targets for the Rifles and so the slaughter continued.

This action continued for some time, but despite all their efforts the French could not dislodge the British from the village. Eventually some French grenadiers managed to out flank the 1/50th and make their way into the village. However they were forced to retreat by some of the 2/43rd held in reserve. In a related action the British cavalry became engaged and lost over half their number. This would not be the last time that the British cavalry came off second best against the French.

The action then switched to the north east of the village where two more French generals, Brennier and Soligac tried to force back the British infantry but with no more success. By noon the French infantry were in disarray and retreating. When Wellesley asked Burrand for permission to pursue and secure the road to Lisbon it was denied despite his strong protests.

The Convention Of Cintra

There now followed one of the most notorious events of the early campaign in the Peninsula. Marshal Junot proposed to Dalrymple and Burrand a treaty by which the French army would leave Portugal, however with fully military honours and that they would be returned to France with their arms and booty by the Royal Navy at British expense. This was agreed in the Convention of Cintra, signed in November 1807 by Dalrymple and Burrand, and at Dalrymple’s insistence by Wellesley. As soon as news of the agreement reach Horse Guards (the Ministry of Defence of the day) there was an enormous public outcry.

The three signatories were summoned to a court of inquiry. Wellesley was totally exonerated and was given a vote of thanks by Parliament for his victories at Rolica and Vimeiro. In the way of these things the other two were not held responsible but Sir Hew was retired and Sir Harry was allowed to keep his command in Portugal, but neither served in the field again.

After the three went back to Britain the command of the Army passed to Sir John Moore, possibly the most popular general officer of the time. There is no doubt that this individual was personally responsible for many of the reforms to the British Army that would help it to be victorious in the Peninsula, at Waterloo and for the next 50 years. However as we will see his field command lasted only just over a year.

Following the victory at Vimeiro British foreign policy in Iberian peninsula was re-assessed and new orders were passed to Sir John Moore. Castlereagh the Foreign Secretary had decided to take a much more positive role in trying to prevent the French occupation of Spain. Accordingly it was decided to use 10,000 men, including 2/IX, as a garrison in Portugal, thus principally in Lisbon. Partly for trading reasons but also to ensure that the post was in British hands for military purposes.

Sir John Moore was ordered to take the other 22,000 men and this included the 1/IX, to join up with the Spanish army in northern Spain in order to prevent the French, now led by Napoleon himself with an army of 150,000, from reaching Madrid, Cadiz and ultimately Gibraltar. The intention was that Moore’s army would be reinforced by a further13,000 men landed at Corunna under the command of Sir David Baird. At this point it should be noted that the French strength throughout Spain exceeded 250,000 men, a very sizeable army by the standards of the day.

Moore recognised that speed was essential, however with the on set of winter he was facing deteriorating climatic conditions. The first stage was the march from Lisbon to Salamanca and then it was his intention to meet up with Baird and move the army to Burgos well to the north east of Madrid and then with the Spanish army they would attempt to turn Napoleon back towards France. The initial stage was over very difficult terrain and a distance of over 300 miles. In "The Recollection of Rifleman Harris" it is suggested that the troop marched something like 500 to 700 miles in a month.

By the time Moores’ troops had consolidated in Salamanca the French army had not only arrived in Burgos but in the process had inflicted a major defeat on the Spanish Army which had thus ceased to be a viable force. For the next four years the Spanish concentrated on a guerrilla war and put their considerable efforts in constantly harrying the French troops.

For the moment Moore was in a very difficult position, he could hardly take on Napoleon on his own, he had yet to even locate his own reinforcements let alone ascertain the position regarding Madrid.

Baird had not been able to land at Corunna because of political problems with the Spanish authorities. Eventually on the 4 November after a two week delay his troop were able to disembark. They then made strenuous efforts to reach Salamanca.

Moore then had a major political problem of his own. He was entrusted with effectively all of Britain’s trained army, and this was no time to take unwarranted risks on behalf of a highly unreliable ally. After careful consideration he devised a plan that would threaten the French lines of communication and draw their forces away from the capital Madrid. Thus it would give the Spanish army breathing space in which to consolidate.

The plan was negated by the fact that Madrid had already fallen to the French. The Spanish junta had already fled to Badajoz. Fortunately on 13 December Sir John received sight of important despatches which were on their way from Napoleon to Soult. As a result the position became clear and a disaster was avoided. Moore changed his plans to try to defeat the isolated Soult, but as he did he learnt that Marshal Ney was moving to cut off his own communications. This left him with no choice but to make a very rapid retreat and evacuation from Corunna in the very north western corner of the Peninsula.

The Retreat To Corunna

There now started what effectively was a race, the British had about a two day start over the French in the run to the coast. It was a distance of about 400 miles over very poor terrain and in the winter.

The retreat took about 12 days. During the course of it there were two cavalry actions, the 15th Hussars drove off a numerically superior force at Sahagun and the 10th Hussars had a similar success at Benavente where they succeeded in capturing a French General. However it was a small success in a very bleak period.

At Astorga the Army split into two, one group made due west for Vigo, but the majority kept on north west to Corunna.

By the time the Army reached Corunna over a fifth of its strength had been lost, either captured, killed, or perished beside the road. In the retreat it was envitable that the weakest would suffer most and many of the families perished in the appalling conditions. In Rifleman Harris he tells how men just laid down and died, they frequently did not wake up in the morning and were found frozen to the ground.

Another problem was that in a number of units the morale and discipline broke down totally to the extent that there were large numbers of deserters. Whether this was the case with 1/IX is not clear. There were stories that in some villages the men got so drunk that they had to be abandoned to the French. However the rearguard, of which 1/IX was an element along with 2/95th and 1/52nd maintained discipline and prevented the French troops of Marshal Soult from encroaching too close.

When the army reached Corunna Sir John Moore was able to restore a degree of order. After being able to get rations, weapons and power the Army turned to face it pursuers. On 16 January 24 hours after the transport ships had arrived Soult attacked the fortifications. Corunna

In commemoration of our part in the interment of Sir John the IX Regiment were authorised to wear a black thread around the lacings on their coatees. As part of the rearguard the IX were one of the last battalions to leave Corunna and Capt. Gomm of the IX claimed to be the last member of the British Army to embark.

When Bereford’s brigade mustered for embarkation between the four battalions (1/6th 1/9th 2/23rd and 2/43rd) there were 250 Officers and men out of a nominal 3,500 that had landed at Montego bay less than six months earlier. Out of these numbers the 1/IX are said to have had 60 officers and men again out of a nominal 800 that had come ashore originally. As for the campfollowers and ancillary services I can only assume that the attrition rate was even higher.

When the troops were landed on the south coast of Britain it was usually done at night so that the populace could not see what an awful state that the Army had returned in.

However you should not forget that there were 10,000 troops still on garrison duty at Lisbon and this included 2/IX.